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Abstract4
Traditional economic models of accident law are static and assume homogeneous individ-5
uals under perfect information. This paper relaxes these assumptions and presents a dynamic6
unilateral accident model in which potential injurers differ in their probability of accident. In-7
formation about individual risk-type is hidden from the social planner and from each potential8
injurer. We ask how negligence standards should be optimally tailored to individual risk-type9
when this is imperfectly observable. We argue that information about past accident experiences10
helps to efficiently define negligence standards, narrowing the distance between first-best stan-11
dards perfectly tailored to individual risk-type and third-best averaged standards. We finally12
show that negligence standards refined on the basis of past accident experiences and of individ-13
ual risk-type do not undermine private incentives to undertake due care.14
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1 Introduction19
The standard unilateral accident model is premised on at least three assumptions that cannot20
be said to hold for many different accidents. First, it is assumed that the relationship between the21
precautions taken and the probability of an accident is the same for all potential injurers. Second, it22
is assumed that both the social planner and each potential injurer know what the relationship is be-23
tween the precautions taken and the probability of an accident. Third, it is assumed that no records24
of past accidents are kept by either the social planner or by the potential injurers. Consequently, the25
negligence standard that is set to minimize the cost of accidents is time invariant and is the same26
for all potential injurers (Shavell, 1980, 1987). In this paper we relax these assumption and define27
a new standard of due care that can be used to minimize the cost of accidents for those accidents28
where these three assumptions are not likely to hold.29
To do so we add three extensions to the standard model. The first extension adds to the model30
two types of potential injurers θ ∈ {
¯
θ , θ¯} who for any given level of precaution x differ in their31
probability of an accident θ¯ p(x) >
¯
θ p(x). The second extension adds to this that neither the32
potential injurers nor the social planner can observe of which type a potential injurer is. Potential33
injurers cannot observe their own type and the social planner cannot observe the type of each34
individual potential injurer. What is observable, however, is the (expected) proportion of each type35
in the population. Finally, as a third extension an additional period is added to the model and it is36
assumed that whilst each type is not observable, it is observable to both the social planner and the37
potential injurer whether a potential injurer was involved in accident in the first period. Starting38
from a common prior – the proportion of each type in the population – both the social planner and39
each potential injurer can update their beliefs about θ based on whether or not an accident occurred40
in the first period.41
The contribution of this paper to the literature is that whilst the implications of individual het-42
erogeneities and information problems have been considered before in the economic analysis of43
accident law, these have not been considered before in an inter-temporal setting where records are44
kept of past accidents (per injurer). The implications of individual heterogeneities for incentives45
that have been considered before are those with respect to the costs of taking care and of the wealth46
of potential injurers (cf. Rubinfeld, 1987; Arlen, 1992; Miceli and Segerson, 1995; Schmitz, 2000),47
the level of harm suffered by the victims and the ability and cost of taking care (cf. Landes and Pos-48
ner, 1987; Kaplow and Shavell, 1996; Miceli, 1997; Ganuza and Gomez, 2005), and with respect49
to the difference in relative gain from potentially harmful activities (cf. Emons, 1990a,b; Emons50
and Sobel, 1991). The implication for the appropriate standard of due care when these type of51
heterogeneities are not observable has been to set an averaged negligence standard as a second best52
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solution even though it is acknowledged that this substantially alters parties’ incentives to take care53
(cf. Landes and Posner, 1987; Shavell, 1987; Schwartz, 1989; Parisi, 1992; Ganuza and Gomez,54
2005; Miceli, 2006; Bajtelsmit and Thistle, 2009; Endres and Friehe, 2011).155
By recasting this problem within an inter-temporal accident model, we show that information56
about past accidents conveys useful information about a potential injurer’s type. This information57
allows the social planner to tailor negligence standards to past accidents and thus to better ap-58
proximate the first best solution. The standards of due-care, therefore, set (optimal) precautionary59
incentives at the same time as these help to convey information about an individual’s type.2 We60
thus suggest and justify a revised definition of negligence standards, by showing that when it is not61
possible to set the first best solution, due care standards tailored to past accidents implement the62
second best solution whereas averaged negligence standards implement the third-best solution.63
Closely related to our paper are Crocker and Doherty (2000), Bajtelsmit and Thistle (2008) and64
Bajtelsmit and Thistle (2009), where the focus is on the incentives to purchase liability insurance. In65
Crocker and Doherty (2000) there are two types of potential injurers who differ in their probability66
of an accident. The standards of due care are tailored to the type of the potential injurer and67
the potential injurers do not know their own type. The model in Crocker and Doherty (2000)68
differs from our model in that there it is assumed that potential injurers can choose to learn their69
type at zero costs, in which case precaution levels are optimal, or to remain ignorant about their70
type, in which case liability insurance is purchased. Bajtelsmit and Thistle (2009) extends this71
analysis and investigates what the incentives of the potential injurers in Crocker and Doherty (2000)72
are when (i) courts apply a uniform standard of negligence, (ii) courts apply an individualized73
standard of care, (iii) insurance companies can and (iv) cannot distinguish between informed and74
uninformed injurers. Bajtelsmit and Thistle (2009) concludes that in equilibrium potential injurers75
decide to become informed about their own risk-type, undertake the due-care standard and do not76
demand insurance. Our paper adds to this literature by demonstrating that, in the absence of liability77
insurance and the possibility to become informed, negligence standards help to convey information78
about individual risk-type to the social planner as well as to potential injurers.79
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model; Sections 3 and 4 characterize80
the social and private objectives. Section 5 examines the implications of the revised model and81
concludes the paper. The proofs of the propositions can be found in the Appedix A.82
1The previous literature has recognized the inefficiency of applying the reasonable person standard in the presence
of heterogeneous parties because it requires different individuals to invest in the same level of care, but defended the
application of a uniform standard when parties’ heterogeneities are costly to assess (cf. Diamond, 1974; Landes and
Posner, 1987; Shavell, 1987).
2I.e. screen for heterogeneous injurers. Cf. Feess and Wohlschlegel (2006) and Friehe (2009).
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2 The Basic Model83
The basic model considered here is a model of those unilateral accidents that can be said to84
occur very often and where a potential injurer (T) can choose to take precaution x to reduce the85
probability of an accident p(x) at a decreasing rate (p′ < 0; p′′ > 0) where p(x) is assumed to be86
continuously differentiable. The harm suffered by the victim and the damages to be paid by an87
injurer in an accident are denoted by h and d.
N
θ θ
θ p (x) 1− θ p (x) θ p (x) 1− θ p (x)
q q
t = 0
t = 1
t = 2
θ p (xA) 1− θ p (xA) θ p (x¬A) 1− θ p (x¬A) θ p (xA) 1− θ p (xA) θ p (x¬A) 1− θ p (x¬A)
A A¬A ¬A
Figure 1: Extensive form representation of the timing of the model
88
89
The timing of the model is as followed (see Figure 1). At time t = 0 Nature allocates potential90
injurers to one of two types θ ∈ {
¯
θ , θ¯} with probability q¯ and
¯
q where θ¯ >
¯
θ (First Extension).91
This information is hidden from potential injurers and the social planner, and only the probabilities92
are known as indicated by the dashed line in Figure 1 (Second Extension). At time t = 1 potential93
injurers not knowing their own type have to choose how much precaution x to take. The probability94
that potential injurers will be involved in an accident is given by θ¯ p(x) and
¯
θ p(x) with θ¯ p(x)≤ 195
and
¯
θ p(x) ≥ 0 where θ¯ p(x) >
¯
θ p(x) for any given level of precaution taken x. At time t = 296
potential injurers are divided into two groups: A and ¬A. The group whose members had an97
accident before t = 2 is denoted by A and the group whose members did not have an accident is98
denoted by ¬A (Third Extension). The precaution that the members of each group take at time t = 299
can now be denoted by xA and x¬A.100
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At time t = 1 the (expected) proportion of potential injurers of type θ¯ and of type
¯
θ in the
population are given by σ¯ and
¯
σ with σ¯ = q¯ and
¯
σ =
¯
q. At time t = 2 the proportions are σ¯A and
¯
σA for the group that had an accident and σ¯¬A and ¯
σ¬A for the group that did not have an accident.
The relationship between these parameters and those mentioned previously can be seen in Figure 1
and can be written down as:
σ¯A =
σ¯ θ¯ p(x¯)
σ¯ θ¯ p(x¯)+
¯
σ
¯
θ p(
¯
x)
(2.1)
¯
σA = ¯
σ
¯
θ p(
¯
x)
σ¯ θ¯ p(x¯)+
¯
σ
¯
θ p(
¯
x)
(2.2)
σ¯¬A =
σ¯
(
1− θ¯ p(x¯))
σ¯
(
1− θ¯ p(x¯))+
¯
σ (1−
¯
θ p(
¯
x))
(2.3)
¯
σ¬A = ¯
σ (1−
¯
θ p(
¯
x))
σ¯
(
1− θ¯ p(x¯))+
¯
σ (1−
¯
θ p(
¯
x))
(2.4)
These are thus the conditional probabilities that a member of group A or ¬A is of type θ¯ or
¯
θ where
the probability of an accident or not is given by qA and q¬A (see the denominator):
qA = σ¯ θ¯ p(x¯)+ ¯
σ
¯
θ p(
¯
x) (2.5)
q¬A = σ¯
(
1− θ¯ p(x¯))+
¯
σ (1−
¯
θ p(
¯
x)) (2.6)
It follows from the difference in the probability of an accident between the types (∀x θ¯ p(x)>101
¯
θ p(x)) that the ratio of the proportion of type θ¯ to the proportion of type
¯
θ is the highest for the102
group the members of which were involved in an accident and the lowest for the group the members103
of which were not involved in an accident:3104
σ¯A
¯
σA
>
σ¯
¯
σ
>
σ¯¬A
¯
σ¬A
(2.7)
In other words: the (low) high risk types are (under-) overrepresented in the group that had an105
accident at time t = 1 and are (over-) underrepresented in the group that did not have an accident at106
3Equation (2.7) can be re-written as: σ¯ θ¯ p(x¯)
¯
σ
¯
θ p(
¯
x) >
σ¯
¯
σ >
σ¯ (1−θ¯ p(x¯))
¯
σ (1−
¯
θ p(
¯
x)) it holds here that x¯ = ¯
x as the information about
the type of the potential injurer is hidden. For σ¯ θ¯ p(x¯)
¯
σ
¯
θ p(x¯) >
σ¯
¯
σ it holds because θ¯ > ¯
θ meaning that the number the
numerator is multiplied with is larger than the number the denominator is multiplied with. For σ¯
¯
σ >
σ¯ (1−θ¯ p(x¯))
¯
σ (1−
¯
θ p(
¯
x)) it
holds because the numerator is multiplied by a smaller number than the number the denominator is multiplied with:
1−
¯
θ p(
¯
x)> 1− θ¯ p(x¯) which simplifies to θ¯ >
¯
θ .
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time t = 1 compared to their proportion (
¯
σ ) σ¯ in the population. This is relevant when information107
about which potential injurer belongs to which type is hidden (x¯ =
¯
x) from both the social planner108
and each potential injurer. The social planner can use this information to improve social welfare109
by tailoring the negligence standard to past accidents. Similarly potential injurers can use this110
information to adjust their care levels to improve their own private welfare. The extension to111
Shavell (1980, 1987) that we thus consider is a dynamic unilateral accident model with hidden112
information, where both the social planner and the injurer are Bayesian updaters.113
3 The Social Planner’s Problem114
Following Section 2 the social planner’s problem can now be written down as the weighted sum
– weighted by the probability of having an accident or not – of three social cost function (omitting
arguments):
min S = S1+qA SA+q¬A S¬A (3.1)
These three social cost functions are defined in equations (3.2), (3.3), and (3.4) as followed:
S1 = σ¯
(
θ¯ p(x¯) h+ x¯
)
+
¯
σ (
¯
θ p(
¯
x) h+
¯
x) (3.2)
SA = σ¯A (x¯, ¯
x)
(
θ¯ p(x¯A) h+ x¯A
)
+
¯
σA (x¯, ¯
x) (
¯
θ p(
¯
xA) h+ ¯
xA) (3.3)
S¬A = σ¯¬A (x¯, ¯
x)
(
θ¯ p(x¯¬A) h+ x¯¬A
)
+
¯
σ¬A (x¯, ¯
x) (
¯
θ p(
¯
x¬A) h+ ¯
x¬A) (3.4)
The first function is the sum of the total social cost due to the expected accident costs over the115
two types weighed by their share at time t = 1. The second function is the sum of the total social116
cost at time t = 2 for those potential injurers who were involved in an accident at time t = 1. The117
third function is the same as the second function but then for those potential injurers who were not118
involved in an accident at time t = 1. These last two are weighted by the probability of an accident119
and the total of all three adds up to the total social cost of an accident over two periods.120
By writing down the social planner’s problem, the welfare implications of the social incentives121
derived under perfect information with tailoring to potential injurer type, hidden information with122
tailoring to past accidents, and hidden information without tailoring to past accidents can be com-123
pared to one another. The following theorems hold for these comparisons under the assumptions124
that we’ve made:125
Lemma 3.1. The social incentives set by tailoring the (per period) standard of due care to the type126
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of potential injurer, and only to the type of the potential injurer, are the first best social incentives.127
Proof. see Appendix A128
Proposition 3.2. The social incentives under hidden information can be improved upon by tailoring129
the (per period) standard of due care to records containing information on past accidents.130
Proof. see Appendix A131
Corollary 3.3. Tailoring the standard of due care to the type of the potential injurer implements132
the first best solution to the social planner’s problem, tailoring the standard of due care to past133
accidents implements the second best solution to the social planner’s problem, and not tailoring134
the standard of due care implements the third best solution to the social planner’s problem.135
These comparisons can be said to depend on to which variables the social planner is constrained.136
When the social planner tailors the standards of due care to the type of the potential injurer, the137
constraint faced by the social planner is that the standard of due care is the same for each type and138
does not depend on whether or not the potential injurer was involved in an accident (i.e. x¯A = x¯¬A139
and
¯
xA = ¯
x¬A). Reformulating the social planner’s problem as a Lagrangian we find that the shadow140
prices of these two constraints are equal to zero proving the first part of the lemma 3.1. The proof141
demonstrates that under the assumptions that we have made no information about past accidents is142
required to attain the global minimum of the total social cost function in equation (3.1). The proof143
of the second part of the lemma 3.1 follows then by imposing constraints such that it is not possible144
to tailor the standards of due care to the type, but only to past accidents (i.e. x¯ =
¯
x, x¯A = ¯
xA, and145
x¯¬A = ¯
x¬A). The shadow prices associated with these constraints are nonzero which completes the146
proof of lemma 3.1. For the comparison between the social incentives when information is hidden147
the relevant constraint is that it is not possible to tailor standards of due care to past accidents in148
addition to that it is not possible to differentiate the standards of due care by the type of potential149
injurer. The latter is substituted into the problem leaving us with xA = x¬A. The shadow price of150
this constraint is nonzero indicating that the constraint is binding and constrains the minimum that151
would otherwise be attained and thus proving proposition 3.2. The corollary 3.3 then follows from152
lemma 3.1 and proposition 3.2.153
The implications of corollary 3.3 are that when the first best is not available (i) that the the154
standard of due care at t = 2 should be higher (lower) for potential injurers who were (not) involved155
in an accident at time t = 1 compared to the situation where information about past accidents (per156
injurer) is hidden (lemma 3.4); and (ii) that the standard of due care should be lower, higher or157
the same at t = 1 compared to the situation where information about past accidents (per injurer) is158
hidden (lemma 3.5). This provided that social costs of an accident should be minimized.159
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Lemma 3.4. The social incentives under hidden information with tailoring to past accidents imply160
a higher (lower) standard of due care for potential injurers at t = 2 who were (not) involved in an161
accident at t = 1 compared to standard of due care implied by the social incentives under hidden162
information without tailoring to past accidents at t = 2163
Proof. See Appendix A164
Lemma 3.5. The social incentives under hidden information with tailoring to past accidents at165
t = 2 imply a lower, higher or equal standard of due care at t = 1 compared to the standard of due166
care at t = 1 implied by the social incentives under hidden information without tailoring to past167
accidents at t = 2.168
Proof. omitted4169
The intuition for lemma 3.4 is that when conditioning on past accidents the group that did have170
an accident at t = 1 consists of a higher (lower) proportion of potential injurers that are of the type171
that have a high (low) probability of an accident than the population of potential injurers at t = 1.172
On average this group, therefore, has a higher probability of being involved in accident and this173
means that the standard of due care should go up. The same can be said to hold for the group that174
did not have an accident at t = 1. On average this group has a lower probability of being involved175
in accident and the standard of due care, therefore, should go down.176
The intuition for lemma 3.5 is that when conditioning on past accidents the total social costs177
of an accident are reduced at t = 2 compared to the situation when it is not possible to condition178
on past accidents. This means that the standard of due care at t = 1 can now be used to produce179
information to further reduce the cost of accidents at t = 2 by lowering this standard or to reduce180
the cost of accidents at t = 1 by raising this standard. If there is a large difference in the probability181
of accidents between the two types then the production of information is relatively more valuable,182
whereas if there is hardly any difference this information has relatively little value for reducing183
the costs of accidents at t = 2. At the same time the standard of due care at t = 1 can be used to184
re-allocate the costs of accidents between t = 1 and t = 2. This is relatively more valuable if the185
costs of accidents are high at t = 1 and low at t = 2. Which of these two effects dominates – the186
production of information or the redistribution of accident losses – depends on the parameters of187
the problem.188
4Any parameterized example can show this. Example available upon request from the authors.
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4 Private Objective189
Having answered whether negligence standards should be tailored to past accidents in the affir-190
mative, we need to solve for the private minimization problem of each potential injurer before we191
are able to implement the socially efficient solution. The timeline is the same as above. At t = 0192
Nature moves and assigns each potential injurer her type. At t = 1 each potential injurer chooses193
how much precaution to take. At t = 2 each potential injurer again choose how much precaution to194
take.195
The potential injurer’s objective function under imperfect information is equivalent to that of196
the social planner, and can be written as (omitting arguments):197
min
x,,xA,x¬A
T = T1+PA TA+P¬A T¬A (4.1)
The three private cost functions are T1 for the first period, TA for the second period if an accident
did occur, and T¬A for the second period if an accident did not occur, and are defined as follows:
T1 (x) = σ¯
(
θ¯ p(x) d+ x
)
+
¯
σ (
¯
θ p(x) d+ x) (4.2)
TA (x,xA) = σ¯A
(
θ¯ p(xA) d+ xA
)
+
¯
σA (¯
θ p(xA) d+ xA) (4.3)
T¬A (x,x¬A) = σ¯¬A
(
θ¯ p(x¬A) d+ x¬A
)
+
¯
σ¬A (¯
θ p(x¬A) d+ x¬A) (4.4)
The private optimization problem is the same as the social optimization problem except with one198
difference. Whilst from the social planner’s perspective, σ¯A, σ¯¬A, ¯
σA, and ¯
σ¬A are functions of the199
precaution taken in the first period, for the potential injurer these are parameters when there are200
(infinitely) many pairs of potential injurers and victims.201
The following corollary and proposition can be said to hold for the private problem.202
Corollary 4.1. The lemmas 3.1, 3.4, and 3.5, the proposition 3.2, and the corollary 3.3 from the203
social problem carry over to the private problem.204
Proposition 4.2. To align private and social incentives a negligence standard is better than a rule205
of strict liability.206
Proof. omitted207
The intuition for corollary 4.1 is that none of the proofs above depend on σ¯A, σ¯¬A, ¯
σA, and ¯
σ¬A208
being parameters or not. Qualitatively the results, therefore, carry over to the private problem as209
the private problem is formally similar to the social problem.210
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The intuition for the proposition 4.2 is that because σ¯A, σ¯¬A, ¯
σA, and ¯
σ¬A are parameters for211
the private problem, the potential injurers do not fully internalize the benefits of the production of212
information and, therefore, will do less of it. If a potential injurer is involved in accident this reveals213
information to her about her type, but also about the type of all the other potential injurers. The214
social planner can take all of this information into account, whereas the potential injurer cannot if215
there is more than one potential injurer. What this means is that under a rule of strict liability the216
amount of precaution taken at t = 1 will not be socially optimal. From the literature, we, however,217
know that the rule of strict liability can be improved upon here by setting a negligence standard218
at t = 1 that deviates from the amount of precaution taken under a rule of strict liability towards219
the socially efficient level of precaution. If the socially efficient level of precaution is higher the220
negligence standard can be set a little bit higher than the amount of precaution taken under strict221
liability, whereas if the socially efficient level of precaution is lower the negligence standard can222
be set lower than the amount of precaution taken under strict liability. In both instances taking223
the same amount of precaution as is required not to be negligent is privately optimal at t = 1. For224
t = 2 a rule of strict liability is equivalent to a negligence standard. The policy implication that225
flows from this is that the negligence standard can not only be used to solve a coordination problem226
between potential injurers and victims, but also between all potential injurers.227
5 Conclusion228
This paper revisits the standard unilateral accidents model by relaxing three conventional as-229
sumptions that do not correspond with many real-life accident situations: (1) potential injurers are230
rarely identical in their probability of accident; (2) individuals and social planners do not necessar-231
ily have perfect information about individual risk-type; (3) records about past accidents can convey232
information about individual risk-type and can help defining optimal negligence standards. Each233
of these observations allowed us to build and analyze a more general and realistic accident model234
and to derive valuable instruments for policymakers and courts in defining negligence in a large235
number of real-world accident cases.236
Our analysis starts from the premise that in most real-life situations potential injurers differ in237
their probability of accident and that this heterogeneity is hidden information for both individu-238
als and the social planner. Since individuals constantly face the probability of being involved in239
an accident, we recast the traditional static model within an inter-temporal accident model where240
records about previous accident experiences play the crucial role of conveying information about241
individual risk-type. The heterogeneity of potential injures and the inter-temporal accident frame-242
10
work are at the heart of our analysis and add important aspects of reality to the standard model.243
Our results shows that when it is not possible to set the first best solution where the standard of due244
care is perfectly tailored to the risk-type of the potential injurer, due care standards tailored to past245
accidents implement the second best solution whereas averaged negligence standards implement246
the third-best solution. We argue that policymakers and courts could optimally exploit information247
about past accident to better tailor negligence standards to individual risk type.248
Lastly, this paper offers several insights for future research. A natural extension of our model249
would be to analyze the demand of liability insurance in the presence of due-care standards tailored250
to past accident records. In this case, other factors beyond the hidden information on individual251
risk-type —as for example the uncertain operation of the legal system— might be necessary to252
create a demand of insurance (Shavell, 2000). Our framework could be also exploited to identify253
the conditions under which liability insurance is socially desirable, offering a unified framework to254
study the socially optimal combination of negligence standards and liability insurance.255
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Appendix A298
Proof of Lemma 3.1. This statement is equivalent to – having formulated the Lagrangian Λ – that299
(i) the shadow prices associated with the constraint x¯A = x¯¬A and ¯
xA = ¯
x¬A, here denoted by λ¯300
and
¯
λ do not differ from zero, and (ii) that having relaxed these constraints that the shadow prices301
associated with the constraints x¯ =
¯
x, x¯A = ¯
xA, and x¯¬A = ¯
x¬A, here denoted by λ , λA, and λ¬A are302
nonzero. The first means that the minimum cannot be improved upon by tailoring to past accidents303
when it is already possible to tailor to the type, whereas the second means that the minimum can be304
improved upon by tailoring to the type of the potential injurer even when already tailoring to past305
accidents.5306
Step 1 To start with (i) the Lagrangian Λ can be formulated as:307
min
x¯,
¯
x,x¯A,¯
xA,x¯¬A,¯
x¬A,λ¯ ,¯
λ
Λ= σ¯
(
θ¯ p(x¯) h+ x¯
)
+
¯
σ (
¯
θ p(
¯
x) h+
¯
x)
+qA
(
σ¯A (x¯, ¯
x)
(
θ¯ p(x¯A) h+ x¯A
)
+
¯
σA (x¯, ¯
x) (
¯
θ p(
¯
xA) h+ ¯
xA)
)
+q¬A
(
σ¯¬A (x¯, ¯
x)
(
θ¯ p(x¯¬A) h+ x¯¬A
)
+
¯
σ¬A (x¯, ¯
x) (
¯
θ p(
¯
x¬A) h+ ¯
x¬A)
)
+ λ¯ (x¯A− x¯¬A)+ ¯λ (¯xA− ¯x¬A) (A.1)
This can be simplified using the fact that qA and q¬A are the same as the denominator for σA and308
σ¬A for each type. The expression to minimize, therefore, becomes:309
Λ= σ¯
(
θ¯ p(x¯) h+ x¯
)
+
¯
σ (
¯
θ p(
¯
x) h+
¯
x)
+ q¯ θ¯ p(x¯)
(
θ¯ p(x¯A) h+ x¯A
)
+
¯
q
¯
θ p(
¯
x) (
¯
θ p(
¯
xA) h+ ¯
xA)
+ q¯
(
1− θ¯ p(x¯)) (θ¯ p(x¯¬A) h+ x¯¬A)+
¯
q (1−
¯
θ p(
¯
x)) (
¯
θ p(
¯
x¬A) h+ ¯
x¬A)
+ λ¯ (x¯A− x¯¬A)+ ¯λ (¯xA− ¯x¬A)
(A.2)
The FOCs for this problem are:
x¯ : σ¯
(
θ¯ p′ (x¯)+1
)
+ q¯ θ¯ p′ (x¯)
(
θ¯ p(x¯A) h+ x¯A
)− q¯ θ¯ p′ (x¯) (θ¯ p(x¯¬A) h+ x¯¬A)= 0 (A.3)
¯
x :
¯
σ
(
¯
θ p′ (
¯
x)+1
)
+
¯
q
¯
θ p′ (
¯
x) (
¯
θ p(
¯
xA) h+ ¯
xA)−
¯
q
¯
θ p′ (
¯
x) (
¯
θ p(
¯
x¬A) h+ ¯
x¬A) = 0 (A.4)
x¯A : q¯ θ¯ p(x¯)
(
θ¯ p′ (x¯A) h+1
)
+ λ¯ = 0 (A.5)
¯
xA :
¯
q
¯
θ p(
¯
x)
(
¯
θ p′ (
¯
xA) h+1
)
+
¯
λ = 0 (A.6)
x¯¬A : q¯
(
1− θ¯ p(x¯)) (θ¯ p′ (x¯¬A) h+1)− λ¯ = 0 (A.7)
¯
x¬A :
¯
q (1−
¯
θ p(
¯
x))
(
¯
θ p′ (
¯
x¬A) h+1
)−
¯
λ = 0 (A.8)
λ¯ : x¯A− x¯¬A = 0 (A.9)
¯
λ :
¯
xA− ¯x¬A = 0 (A.10)
5This follows essentially from that, dΛ
∗∗
db = λ
∗∗ where b = x¯−
¯
x.
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By eliminating λ¯ from equations (A.5) and (A.7) we find that:310
−q¯ θ¯ p(x¯) (θ¯ p′ (x¯A) h+1)= q¯ (1− θ¯ p(x¯)) (θ¯ p′ (x¯¬A) h+1) (A.11)
By substituting the constraint in equation (A.9) into (A.11) we can re-write it as:311
θ¯ p(x¯)
(
θ¯ p′ (x¯A) h+1
)
= 0 (A.12)
It follows that λ¯ ∗∗ = 0 (see equations (A.5) and (A.7) above) the same holds for
¯
λ ∗∗ proving (i).312
Step 2 To prove (ii) the Lagrangian to be minimized is re-formulated to be the following by:313
Λ= σ¯
(
θ¯ p(x¯) h+ x¯
)
+
¯
σ (
¯
θ p(
¯
x) h+
¯
x)
+ q¯ θ¯ p(x¯)
(
θ¯ p(x¯A) h+ x¯A
)
+
¯
q
¯
θ p(
¯
x) (
¯
θ p(
¯
xA) h+ ¯
xA)
+ q¯
(
1− θ¯ p(x¯)) (θ¯ p(x¯¬A) h+ x¯¬A)+
¯
q (1−
¯
θ p(
¯
x)) (
¯
θ p(
¯
x¬A) h+ ¯
x¬A)
+λ (x¯−
¯
x)+λA (x¯A− ¯xA)+λ¬A (x¯¬A− ¯x¬A)
(A.13)
The FOCs for this problem are:
x¯ : σ¯
(
θ¯ p′ (x¯)+1
)
+ q¯ θ¯ p′ (x¯)
(
θ¯ p(x¯A) h+ x¯A
)− q¯ θ¯ p′ (x¯) (θ¯ p(x¯¬A) h+ x¯¬A)+λ = 0 (A.14)
¯
x :
¯
σ
(
¯
θ p′ (
¯
x)+1
)
+
¯
q
¯
θ p′ (
¯
x) (
¯
θ p(
¯
xA) h+ ¯
xA)−
¯
q
¯
θ p′ (
¯
x) (
¯
θ p(
¯
x¬A) h+ ¯
x¬A)−λ = 0 (A.15)
x¯A : q¯ θ¯ p(x¯)
(
θ¯ p′ (x¯A) h+1
)
+λA = 0 (A.16)
¯
xA :
¯
q
¯
θ p(
¯
x)
(
¯
θ p′ (
¯
xA) h+1
)−λA = 0 (A.17)
x¯¬A : q¯
(
1− θ¯ p(x¯)) (θ¯ p′ (x¯¬A) h+1)+λ¬A = 0 (A.18)
¯
x¬A :
¯
q (1−
¯
θ p(
¯
x))
(
¯
θ p′ (
¯
x¬A) h+1
)−λ¬A = 0 (A.19)
λ : x¯−
¯
x = 0 (A.20)
λA : x¯A− ¯xA = 0 (A.21)
λ¬A : x¯¬A− ¯x¬A = 0 (A.22)
By combining equations (A.16) and (A.17) λA can be eliminated resulting in:314
−q¯ θ¯ p(x¯) (θ¯ p′ (x¯A) h+1)=
¯
q
¯
θ p(
¯
x)
(
¯
θ p′ (
¯
xA) h+1
)
(A.23)
Substituting α
¯
q for q¯ and β
¯
θ for θ¯ the equation above can be re-arranged into:315
−α β = ¯θ p
′ (
¯
xA) h+1
β
¯
θ p′ (x¯A) h+1
(A.24)
For x¯A = ¯
xA it follows that either the denominator is positive and the numerator negative or vice-316
versa:317
¯
θ p′ (
¯
xA) h+1≷ β ¯θ p
′ (x¯A) h+1 (A.25)
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For θ¯ >
¯
θ or β > 0 it holds that the numerator is negative and the denominator positive. This means318
that for the potential injurer of type
¯
θ the standard of due care implied by the social incentives is319
excessive,
¯
θ p′ (
¯
xA) h+ 1 < 0 and that for the potential injurer of type θ¯ this standard of due care320
is inadequate θ¯ p′ (x¯A) h+1 > 0. It follows that in equilibrium λ ∗∗A > 0. This is sufficient to prove321
(ii).322
Proof of Proposition 3.2. This proposition is equivalent to the statement that the shadow price λ ∗∗323
is nonzero for minimization of the following the Lagrangian:324
Λ= σ¯
(
θ¯ p(x) h+ x
)
+
¯
σ (
¯
θ p(x) h+ x)
+ q¯ θ¯ p(x)
(
θ¯ p(xA) h+ xA
)
+
¯
q
¯
θ p(x) (
¯
θ p(xA) h+ xA)
+ q¯
(
1− θ¯ p(x)) (θ¯ p(x¬A) h+ x¬A)+
¯
q (1−
¯
θ p(x)) (
¯
θ p(x¬A) h+ x¬A)
+λ (xA− x¬A)
(A.26)
The FOCs for this problem are:
x : σ¯
(
θ¯ p′ (x) h+1
)
+
¯
σ
(
¯
θ p′ (x) h+1
)
+
q¯ θ¯ p′ (x)
(
θ¯ p(xA) h+ xA
)
+
¯
q
¯
θ p′ (x) (
¯
θ p(xA) h+ xA)−
q¯ θ¯ p′ (x)
(
θ¯ p(x¬A) h+ x¬A
)−
¯
q
¯
θ p′ (x) (
¯
θ p(x¬A) h+ x¬A) = 0
(A.27)
xA : q¯ θ¯ p(x)
(
θ¯ p′ (xA) h+1
)
+
¯
q
¯
θ p(x)
(
¯
θ p′ (xA) h+1
)
+λ = 0 (A.28)
x¬A : q¯
(
1− θ¯ p(x)) (θ¯ p′ (x¬A) h+1)+
¯
q (1−
¯
θ p(x))
(
¯
θ p′ (x¬A) h+1
)−λ = 0 (A.29)
λ : xA− x¬A = 0 (A.30)
Combining equations (A.28) and (A.29) λ can be elminated resulting in:325
− q¯ θ¯ p(x) (θ¯ p′ (xA) h+1)−
¯
q
¯
θ p(x)
(
¯
θ p′ (xA) h+1
)
=
q¯
(
1− θ¯ p(x)) (θ¯ p′ (x¬A) h+1)+
¯
q (1−
¯
θ p(x))
(
¯
θ p′ (x¬A) h+1
) (A.31)
By substituting in the constraint this can be re-arranged into:326
q¯
(
θ¯ p′ (x¬A) h+1
)
+
¯
q
(
¯
θ p′ (x¬A) h+1
)
= 0 (A.32)
Comparing this with the FOC in equation (A.28) it follows that if λ ∗∗ = 0 then θ¯ =
¯
θ . This is a327
contradiction with that θ¯ >
¯
θ proving the proposition.328
Proof of Lemma 3.4. This lemma is equivalent to the statement that:329
x∗∗A > x
∗∗
M > x
∗∗
¬A (A.33)
where x∗∗M denotes the standard of due care under hidden information without tailoring. The equi-
librium values for the variables xA and x¬A are the same as implied by the FOCs (A.28) and (A.29)
of the problem in equation (A.26) without the constraint (A.30), whereas for xM it is the same as
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implied by the FOC (A.27) with the constraint (A.30) substituted into the problem:
xM : 2 σ¯
(
θ¯ p′ (xM) h+1
)
+2
¯
σ
(
¯
θ p′ (xM) h+1
)
= 0 (A.34)
xA : q¯ θ¯ p(x)
(
θ¯ p′ (xA) h+1
)
+
¯
q
¯
θ p(x)
(
¯
θ p′ (xA) h+1
)
= 0 (A.35)
x¬A : q¯
(
1− θ¯ p(x)) (θ¯ p′ (x¬A) h+1)+
¯
q (1−
¯
θ p(x))
(
¯
θ p′ (x¬A) h+1
)
= 0 (A.36)
These three are equivalent to where γ¯ ∈ [0,1]:330
y : γ¯
(
θ¯ p′ (y) h+1
)
+(1− γ¯) (
¯
θ p′ (y) h+1
)
= 0 (A.37)
For this it holds, using the implicit function theorem, that:331
∂y
∂ γ¯
=− θ¯ p
′ (y)−
¯
θ p′ (y)
γ¯ θ¯ p′′ (y)+(1− γ¯)
¯
θ p′′ (y)
(A.38)
It follows from p′ < 0 and θ¯ >
¯
θ that the numerator is negative, whereas the denominator is unam-332
biguously positive given that p′′ > 0. This means that:333
∂y
∂ γ¯
> 0 (A.39)
Together with the inequality in equation (2.7),6
σ¯A
¯
σA
>
σ¯
¯
σ
>
σ¯¬A
¯
σ¬A
this is sufficient to prove the lemma.334
6Recall that equation (2.7) can be re-written as: σ¯ θ¯ p(x¯)
¯
σ
¯
θ p(
¯
x) >
σ¯
¯
σ >
σ¯ (1−θ¯ p(x¯))
¯
σ (1−
¯
θ p(
¯
x)) , where σ¯ = q¯.
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